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Abst rac t - -A  class of RSA encryption exponents whose corresponding decryption exponents have 
a bitlength almost equal to the bitlength of the RSA modulus is analysed. In this way, the attacks 
to small decryption exponent are avoided. (~) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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Attacks to the RSA cryptosystem with short decryption exponent (e.g., see [1-8]) have enlightened 
the interest of using decryption exponents as large as possible. In fact, in order to avoid this 
class of attacks it is usually recommended that the size of the decryption exponent d should be, 
approximately, the same as that of the modulus n = pq of the cryptosystem [9, Section 12.4; 10, 
Section 8.2.2]. If e denotes the encryption exponent, then there exists a positive integer k such 
that de = 1 + k¢(n). As 
1 Jr k¢(n) 
d - < ¢(n), 
e 
we have 
k < ¢(n)e -  1 1 
- -  e - -  - -  
¢(n) ¢(n) 
de .  
Hence, the greatest value that k can reach is k = e - 1. Moreover, as e _> 3, for k = e - 1 we 
obtain 
d= l+(e -e l )¢ (n)  > 1 -  ¢(n)_> 5¢(n)"  
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Accordingly, in this case, the bitlength of d is almost equal to that of ¢(n). Indeed, as 
[lgd] > [ lg (p -1 )+ lg(q -1)+ lg(2) J  
[ lg (p -  1)J + [lg(q - 1)J - 1 
> [lgnJ - 2, 
we have bitlength(d) >_ bitlength(n) - i. 
Below, we analyze the conditions that p, q must satisfy for the equation k -- e - 1 to hold. 
PROPOSITION i. Let  d and e be the decryption and encryption exponents of  the RSA cryptosys- 
tern with modulus  n = pq so that de = l+k¢(n) .  We further assume that k = e -1 .  We 
set rp = p(mod e) and rq = q(mod e), and 
Se = {r c Ze: r ( r - -  1) e Z :} .  
We have 
(a) rp,rq E Se. In particular, rp, rq E Z~ - {0,1}. 
(b) In Z~, we have 
rp 
rq = 
rp -- l"  
(c) I f  e = ~r~ 1. . .  lr~ a' is the pr ime [actorization of e, then 




(a) We have p = e% + rp, with % E N. As p is a prime, it follows that rp E Z~. Moreover, we 
have p - 1 = eap + rp - 1. As gcd(e,p - 1) = 1, we also conclude gcd(e, rp - 1) = 1. 
(b) As 
d = 1 + (e -  1)¢(n) = ¢(n) ¢(n) - 1, 
e e 
it follows that e divides ¢(n) - 1 = pq - p - q; hence, in Ze, we have (rp - 1)rq = rp. 
(c) The formula in the statement readily follows from the fact that an integer s is invertible 
in Z/lr m if and only if it is invertible in Z / r .  | 
REMARKS. 
(i) Let ATe = #Se. Then we have 
Ne t 7h -  2 
7r i 1" 
Hence, if every prime factor of e goes to c~, then the probability of finding a residue in Se 
goes to 1. 
(ii) If e is a prime, then Ne = e - 2. 
(iii) If e -- 3 m, then Are = (1/2) ¢(e). 
1. Encryption exponents whose associated ecryption exponent is of the same size as the 
RSA modulus can be chosen arbitrarily. Once an e is selected, the only constraint is to 
take p and q satisfying items (a) and (b) in the previous proposition, which only affect the 
residues of p and q modulo e. Moreover, as the map x ~-~ x / (x  - 1) is an involution, the 
residues rp and rq play a completely symmetric role. Hence, for every rp E Se corresponds 
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Table 1. Pairs of residues (rp, rq) for several values of e. 
e (rp, rq) 
5 (2, 2), (3, 4) 
7 (2, 2), (3, 5), (4, 6) 
9 (2, 2), (5, 8) 
11 (2, 2), (3, 7), (4, 5), (6, 10), (8, 9) 
13 (2, 2), (3, 8), (4, 10), (5, 11), (6, 9), (7, 12) 
15 (2, 2), (8, 14) 
17 (2, 2), (3, 10), (4, 7), (5, 14), (6, 8), (9, 16), (11, 13), (12, 15) 
21 (2, 2), (5, 17), (11, 20) 
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a un ique  rq E Se such that  (rp, rq) satisf ies the  condi t ions  in the  propos i t ion  above. For 
example ,  rp = 2 if and  on ly  if rq = 2. Th is  is the  only case in which rp = rq. Table 1 
shows the  pairs  (rp, rq) for several  values of e. 
2. I f  e is a p r ime number ,  then  p can be chosen arb i t ra r i l y  and  q is on ly  cond i t ioned  to sat isfy 
equat ion  (1). We remark  that  Ne is as large as possible when e is a pr ime.  On the other  
hand,  if e is a compos i te  number ,  then  Ne may be much smal ler  than  e - 2, thus,  impos ing 
more const ra in ts  to select p and q than  in the  pr ime case. 
3. If e = 3, there  are no const ra in ts  on p and  q, as in th is  case, we have rp = rq = 2 for every 
pair  p, q sat is fy ing the  RSA condit ions.  
REFERENCES 
1. J. Hastad, On using RSA with low exponent in a public-key network, In Proceedings of Crypto '85, Volume 
218, pp. 403-408, LNCS, (1986). 
2. M.J. Wiener, Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 36 (3), 553 558, 
(1990). 
3. D. Coppersmith, M. Franklin, J. Patarin and M. Reiter, Low-exponent RSA with related messages, In 
Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96, Volume 1070, pp. 1-9, LNCS, (1996). 
4. E.R. Verheul and H.C.A. Van Tilborg, Cryptanalysis of 'less short' RSA secret exponents, AppL Algebra 
Engrg. Comm. Comput. 8, 425-435, (1997). 
5. D. Boneh, G. Durfee and Y. Frankel, An attack on RSA given a small fraction of the private key bits, In 
Proceedings of Asiacrypt '98, Volume 1514, pp. 25-34, LNCS, (1998). 
6. D. Boneh, Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem, Notices Amer. Math. Soc. 46 (2), 203-213, 
(1999). 
7. D. Boneh and D. Durfee, Cryptanalysis of RSA with private key d less than N 0"292, IEEE Trans. Inform. 
Theory 46 (4), 1339-1349, (2000). 
8. G. Durfee and P.Q. Nguyen, Cryptanalysis of the RSA schemes with short secret exponent from Asiacrypt 
'99, In Proceedings of Asiacrypt '00, Volume 1976, pp. 14-29, LNCS, (2000). 
9. B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, John Wiley &: Sons, New York, (1994). 
10. A. Menezes, P. Van Oorschot and S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 
FL, (1997). 
